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INTRODUCTION
Loyalty is a central tenet to a lawyer’s relationship with a client.1 Yet, the phrase “duty 
of loyalty” is so ubiquitous in the conflict of interest rules that the phrase has become 
axiomatic.2  On the contrary, loyalty rightly has been described by some as a “fulcrum in the 
persistent struggle to define the nature of lawyering.”3  Inherent in the duty of loyalty are the 
duties to avoid conflict of interests, preserve client property, and preserve client 
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2confidentiality.4  Of the three duties, perhaps no duty provides as many ethical pitfalls as the 
duty to avoid conflicts of interests.5
In their article titled The Practice of Law and Conflicts of Interest: Living Close to the 
Line, Spellmire and Tweet succinctly outline the three basic situations where conflicts arise.6
The three situations are described as follows:
First, conflicts can exist between the clients' expressed interests and society's 
interest in the administration of justice. Second, a conflict can exist when the 
interests of one client may impair the independent professional judgment of 
the lawyer with regard to another client. Third, a conflict can exist when 
lawyers' own interests may impair their exercise of independent professional 
judgment on behalf of a client. This third situation is more accurately 
described as the representation of "adverse interests."7
As will be discussed later, circumstances giving rise to a conflict of interest necessarily 
involve a diminution in the ability to carry out the duties of maintaining client 
confidentiality and preservation of client property, even though each are considered part of 
the tripartite of loyalty.8  Yet, an attorney acting under a conflict of interest also implicates 
the inability of the attorney to fulfill other core duties such as competence and 
4
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3communication to the client.9  That is why many attorneys today “tend[] to equate all of 
ethics with conflicts of interests.”10
The risks associated with practicing law are increasing.11  Today, allegations that a 
lawyer has failed to exercise independent judgment on behalf of a client due to a conflict of 
interest are a common basis for malpractice suits;12 in extreme cases, an attorney’s statements 
regarding his conflicts of interest may result in jail time.13  The increasing rate of law firm 
mergers14 and attorney lateral movement between law firms,15 coupled with the corresponding 
exponentional growth and expansion of law firms’ corporate clients16 creates an ethical 
environment nearly impossible to navigate in today’s complicated legal landscape.  As a 
9 Id.
10William J. Wernz, Essay, The Ethics of Large Law Firms – Responses and 
Reflections, 16 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 175, 188 (2002). 
11Spellmire and Tweet, supra note 6, at 472. 
12 Id. 
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John Gellene Sentenced to 15 Months, 08/10/98 NLJ A6).  
14Jane A. Boyle, Loyalty and Confidentiality: Attorney Obligations and Client 
Expectations in the 1990’s, SC42 ALI-ABA 923, 925 (1998) (internal quotes omitted). 
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1203, 1203 (2002). 
4result, law firms have expended significant resources implementing conflict-checking systems 
to avoid these conflicts.17
Given the many competing, yet coexisting ethical duties of an attorney, aggravated by 
the complicated network due to the shifting and ambiguous status of clients, it is a misnomer 
that an attorney can avoid conflicts altogether.  Some conflicts are inevitable.18  For example, 
Prof. Dennis Tuchler, a law professor at St. Louis University School of Law, points out in his 
article Unavoidable Conflicts of Interests and the Duty of Loyalty, that “conflicts between a 
client’s interest arise naturally from the business relationship between them.”19  Thus, it is 
more accurate to say that an attorney must actually juggle competing loyalties and avoid 
totally only certain types of enumerated conflicts of interests.20
17 See Brad W. Robbins & Martin L. Stalnaker, Large Firms Polled: Trend Toward 
Conflict-System Automation, 1987 NAT’L L.J. 17, 17, 22 (describing the increasing use of 
sophisticated computer databases to detect potential conflicts by large firms).
18 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 8, at § 10.1.  
19
 Dennis J. Tuchler, Unavoidable Conflicts of Interest and the Duty of Loyalty, 44 ST. 
LOUIS U. L.J. 1025, 1025 (2000). 
20 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 8, at § 10.1.  The fact that an attorney cannot avoid 
totally all conflicts illustrates the problem with the broad-brush platitudes often exhibited in 
court opinions such as the oft-cited Cinema 5 Ltd. v. Cinerama, Inc, 528 F.2d 1384 stating 
that “the propriety of [an attorney’s conduct] must be measured . . . against the duty of 
undivided loyalty which an attorney owes to each of his clients.”  Id. at 1386.  The quote 
exemplifies the hollowness of some of these conventions: by definition an attorney cannot 
have “undivided loyalty” to more than one object at a time.    
5As difficult as it is to traverse the minefields of today’s ethical landscape,21 often 
equally difficult is deciding the prudent course of action after one becomes enmeshed in an 
ethical quagmire.  Although the Model Rules of Professional Conduct and the respective rules 
adopted by the states “admonish attorneys to avoid conflicts of interests, they provide little 
guidance in advising attorney how to disentangle themselves once a conflict has arisen.”22  In 
response to these difficulties, the Rules of Professional Conduct promulgated by the ABA and 
adopted by the states espouse a fairly “generous attitude towards lawyer withdrawal.”23
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct proscribe the general rule that an attorney is 
free to withdraw from representation “if it can be accomplished without material adverse 
effect on the client’s interest.”24 In other words, an attorney could terminate a client without 
cause as long as the client was not actually harmed.25  Nonetheless, the rules of permissive 
withdrawal have been tightened where an attorney terminates the representation of a client 
due to the attorney’s own economic interest.26  One recently adopted limit on attorney 
withdrawal is described in the “hot potato rule.”  The so-called “hot potato rule,” coined in the 
frequently quoted Picker Int’l, Inc. v. Varian Ass., Inc., states that “a firm may not drop a 
21
 A variation of the title TRAVERSING THE ETHICAL MINEFIELDS, by Susan Martyn & 
Lawrence Fox, which is a casebook used in Professional Responsibility classes.
22 Flatt v. Superior Court, 885 P.2d 950, 964 (Cal. 1995) (Kennard, J., dissenting). 
23 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 10, at § 20.10.
24 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16(d) (2002). 
25Id.
26 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 132 cmt. c 
(2005). 
6client like a hot potato, especially if it is to keep happy a far more lucrative client.”27  This 
restriction on the permissive withdrawal rules has been adopted by nearly every state.28 At the 
same time, many courts have revisited the “hot potato” rule since its adoption and have begun 
carving out exceptions to the rule, especially when the conflict arises through no fault of the 
lawyer.29
The rule has two applications: 1) in disciplinary proceedings, and 2) in situations 
where one party seeks to disqualify opposing counsel due to a conflict of interest.  The hot 
potato rule is most often applied when an attorney enters inadvertently into a concurrent 
conflict of interest and seeks to avoid disqualification by converting a less favored client into 
a former client.30  A common example is where firm A represents a client, but the firm then 
merges with firm B, who has a more desirable client engaged in litigation with the other client 
in a separate, but unrelated, case.31  Under the hot potato rule, the firm must withdraw from 
representing both parties in the two cases, absent special circumstances, and cannot choose 
one client over the other.32
27
 670 F. Supp. 1363, 1365 (N.D. Ohio 1987). 
28
 Anne Melissa Rossheim, Simultaneous Representation: Cracks Begin to Appear in 
Per Se Disqualification Rule, 11 No. 13 of Counsel 5, 5 (1992).  
29 Id.
30
 Sylvia Stevens, Hot Potatoes, 58 Or. St. B. Bull. 27, 27 (1998) 
31 RONALD D. ROTUNDA AND JOHN S. DZIENKOWSKI, LEGAL ETHICS – THE LAWYER’S 
DESKBOOK ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY § 1.7-5 (2005-2006 ed.).   
32 Id.
7Alternatively, and more controversially, the “hot potato rule” has been applied in 
limited cases where an attorney pre-emptively discharges a current client, thus attempting to 
transform him into a former client, and then accepts representation from a new, more lucrative 
client.33  In this scenario, a “preexisting client is treated as a former client if the withdrawal 
occurs at the time that the client and the lawyer contemplated the end of the representation: 
the client is former because the lawyer has completed the discrete assignment.  Or, the client 
is former because the client has discharged the lawyer.”34
Though utilized far more in disqualification proceedings,35 both modes of enforcement 
rely purely on the fear of circumvention of the conflict of interests rules and the implications 
of loyalty in “switching sides”36 of a conflict in order to secure a more lucrative client. Yet, 
courts find it difficult to draw such an interpretation directly from the Model Code and its 
progeny.37  This Note will examine in Part I the history of the relevant Professional Cannons, 
Professional Codes of Professional Responsibility, and Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
dealing with conflicts of interests and termination of client representation.  Part II summarizes 
33 See Santocroce v. Neff, 134 F. Supp 2d 366 (D.N.J. 2001) (holding that a terminated 
client will be treated as a current client if the motive was to avoid a conflict of interest 
between two clients). 
34 ROTUNDA & DZIENKOWSKI, supra note 31, at §1.7-5. 
35 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 8, at §10.1.
36MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.9 cmt. 2 (stating that “the underlying 
question is whether was so involved in the matter that the subsequent representation can be 
justly regarded as a changing of sides in the matter in question). 
37HAZARD & HODES, supra note 8, at §20.11. 
8the various cases where courts have adopted the hot potato rule to either disqualification or 
disciplinary proceedings and describe the various exceptions to the Hot Potato rule adopted by 
the courts.    Part III will analyze the relationship, or lack thereof, between the evolution of the 
model rules, the relevant case law in their adoption of the hot potato rule, and the ultimate 
goals of the legal self-governing system.  Part IV will then describe the various ways that law 
firms circumvent the hot potato rule and the practical effects that the hot potato rule has on 
today’s legal environment.  Finally, Part V will advocate for the abolition of the hot-potato 
rule as currently applied by the courts.
I. HISTORY OF THE PROFESSIONAL RULES
A. Conflicts of Interest Rules
The ethical rules promulgated by the ABA have gone through four major incarnations:
the 1908 Cannons of Ethics, ABA Model Codes Of Responsibility of 1969, and the ABA 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct of 1983 & 2002.38  In addition, the ALI‘s Restatement 
(Third) of The Law Governing Lawyers builds on many of the ABA’s rules and draws on 
prevailing trends in case law from various jurisdictions.39  Though the rules regarding 
conflicts of interest have largely remained the same, the requirements regarding permissive 
withdrawal have been marked by a trend towards giving an attorney greater discretion and 
38
 Though the rules are often amended from year to year, this discussion includes only 
the major changes from year to year.  The 2002 Model Rules are included even though they 
are not ground breaking, but by virtue of being the most recent.
39 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 8, at § 10.2. 
9mobility.40  On the other hand, both the ABA and the respective state courts continue to have 
difficulty concisely and simply articulating the rules regarding conflicts of interests: the topic 
of conflict of interests spans 181 pages in the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing 
Lawyers and over eighty-five comments in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.41
Interestingly, the original Cannons of Ethics, adopted by the ABA in 1908, did not use 
“loyalty” as a basis for the conflict of interest rules.42  In terms of concurrent conflicts, Canon 
6 merely stated that it was “unprofessional to represent differing interests.”43  The same canon 
also governed former-client conflicts, it reads:
 The obligation to represent the client with undivided fidelity and not to 
divulge his secrets or confidences forbids also the subsequent acceptance of 
retainers or employment from others in matters adversely affecting any interest 
of the client with respect to which confidence has been reposed.44
Note, however, the original Canons did not reach the question of permissive withdrawal; the 
rules governing permissive withdrawal were not adopted until the promulgation of the Model 
Code of Professional Responsibility in 1969.45  The 1969 Model Code attempted to prescribe 
40
 Compare MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 2 and MODEL RULES OF 
PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY R. 1.16.
41Wernz, Essay, supra note 10, at 187 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW 
GOVERNING LAWYERS ch. 8 (2000) and the ABA MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7).
42
 Tuft, supra note 2, at 14. 
43
 ABA CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS, Cannon 6 (1908). 
44 Id. 
45 See MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, DR 2-110  (1969) (stating in general 
the requirements for permissive withdrawal).  
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the conflict of interest rules more thoroughly, but in a “confused and confusing way.”46
Canon 5 governed concurrent representation and sought to ensure that an attorney 
“exercise[d] independent professional judgment on behalf of a client” by prohibiting the 
acceptance or continuance of concurrent representation of multiple clients when the attorney 
would be involved in representing “differing interests” or the attorney’s professional 
judgment would be adversely affected by the division of loyalty.47
The rule also recognized that an attorney’s own “financial, business, property, or 
personal interests” might affect an attorney’s professional judgment on behalf of a client.48
Oddly, former-client conflicts were not included in Canon 5 and where mentioned nowhere 
else in the code.49 Instead, the rules governing confidentiality, EC 4-5, and the creation of 
Canon 9, which states,  “a lawyer should avoid even the appearance of impropriety” were 
generally thought to govern, among other broad principles, former client conflicts.50
Furthermore, neither EC 4-5, nor Canon 9 mentioned the importance of loyalty in avoiding 
conflict of interests.51 Thus reading EC-4-5 and Cannon 9 together creates the inference that 
the sole purpose of the rules was to maintain the integrity of the client-lawyer relationship by 
preserving client confidences.  
46 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 8, at §10.1.
47 See MODEL CODE OF PROF’L CONDUCT DR 5-105(A) & (B) (1969).
48 Id. at DR 5-101(A).
49 WOLFRAM, supra note 1, at 315. 
50 Id.
51 Id. at 363. 
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The framers of the 1983 Model Rules expanded the conflict of interests rules from one 
canon to six separate sections in an effort to cure many of the prior deficiencies.52  The new 
locus of the modern approach to the conflict of interest rules became regulating the degree of 
risk that a lawyer will be unable to adequately fulfill all of the competing interests in a given 
matter.53  In other words, the rules attempted to manage the degree of likelihood that a 
conflict of interest will actually have an adverse effect -- even if the harm never occurs –
whereas the Canons were preoccupied with whether the attorney “appeared” to be acting 
ethically from the point of view of the client and the public.54  The California Supreme Court 
in Flatt v. Superior Court55 highlighted this concern in the Rules as follows:
The rule is designed not alone to prevent the dishonest practitioner from 
fraudulent conduct, but as well to preclude the honest practitioner from putting 
himself in a position where he may be required to choose between conflicting 
duties, or be led to attempt to reconcile conflicting interests, rather than to 
enforce to their full extent the rights of the interests which he should alone 
represent.56
The Model rules abandoned the vague “appearance of impropriety”57 standard in favor 
of language defining a conflict of interest in terms of its probable outcome.58 Thus the new 
52 Id. at 315. 
53 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 8, at §10.4.
54 Id.
55
 885 P.2d 950 (Cal. 1995).
56 Id. at 958 (quoting Anderson v. Eaton, 211 Cal. 113, 116 (1930)). 
57
 For an interesting discussion on the “appearance of impropriety” standard still in 
existence in the Judicial Cannons, see Alex Kozinski, The Real Issues of Judicial Ethics, 32 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1095 (2004).  Judge Alex Konzinski’s view on the standard is as follows:
12
rule stated that a conflict of interest exists where “there is a significant risk that the 
representation of one or more clients will be materially limited” or, in the case of former-
client conflicts, case law evolved prohibiting an attorney representing a new client when the 
matter was “substantially related.”59  Thus, the objective method of judging conflict of 
interests and the concern for the public’s confidence in the profession remained.60  Also of 
relevance was the addition of ethical consideration 5-2 to the Model Code, which states, 
“[T]he lawyer’s own interests should not be permitted to have an adverse effect on 
representations of a client.”61
The rules governing former-client conflicts drafted in the 1983 Model Rules are 
substantially the same as they are today.  The Model Rules still reflects that the foremost duty 
a lawyer owes to a former client is the avoidance of adverse use of confidential information 
learned during the representation.62  The Rules officially adopted the “substantial relationship 
My problem with the appearance of impropriety standard isn't so much that it's 
bad on its own terms, though I think it probably is. Rather, the standard 
promotes the wrong idea--that in order to keep judges from acting unethically, 
ethical rules must prevent judges from appearing to act unethically. It also 
seems to suggest the converse: that if judges appear to be acting ethically, they 
probably are. Nothing could be further from the truth. A judge can appear to 
act ethically and still betray his responsibility in essential respects, and in ways 
that no one will ever know about.
Id. at 1105.  
58WOLFRAM, supra note 1, at 315.  
59 Id. 
60Id. 
61 MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 5 (1969). 
62 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 8, at § 13.3. 
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test” regarding former client conflicts as the litmus test for gauging the likelihood that 
confidential information could be used to the disadvantage of the client.63  Specifically, Rule 
1.9(a) prohibits representation of a client if the claim “is the same as, or substantially related 
to” the previous representation or where such representation would be “materially adverse” to 
the former client.64  Somewhat noteworthy, the significant relationship test applied even if no 
confidences were divulged during the court of the representation65 – presumably to prevent an 
attorney from consciously limiting the representation to leave the door open to future clients, 
or fail to zealously pursue the former claim to leave a client legally vulnerable in the future.66
Thus, the principle evolved that an attorney may not attack his own work.67
As stated above, the provisions related to current client and former client conflict of 
interests remained unchanged in the new version of the Model Rules.68  Other than 
reorganizing the section regarding conflict of interests with a current client, the prohibitions 
contained in Rules 1.7 and 1.9 remained substantively unchanged, with one caveat.69  Among 
other minute changes, the Commission added a sentence in Comment 6 of Rule 1.7, “The 
63 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.9(a) (1983)  
64 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 8, at § 13.3.
65 E.F Hutton & Company v. Brown, 305 F. Supp 371 (S.D. Tex. 1969). 
66 WOLFRAM, supra note 1, at 362.  
67 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.9 cmt. 3 (1983). 
68
 Margaret Colgate Love, The Revised ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct: 
Summary of the Work of Ethics 2000, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 441 (2002) (describing the 
substantive changes between 1983 and 2002 Model Rules). 
69 Id. at 452, 454. 
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Lawyer’s Interests,” which states that an attorney’s representation of a client may become 
materially limited “when a lawyer has discussions concerning possible employment with an 
opponent of the lawyer’s client, or with a law firm representing the opponent.”70
At first glance, the adoption of this language into the 2002 Model Rules suggests that 
a lawyer or firm’s intent to either merge with an opposing law firm or represent an adverse 
party would taint any subsequent withdrawal from the current client.  However, ABA formal 
opinion 96-400 sheds light on this new language.  In the opinion, the ABA states:
A means that may be available, in some circumstances, to avoid the conflict 
that would be presented by a lawyer’s employment negotiations with a firm he 
opposes in a matter is for the lawyer to withdraw from the adverse 
representation before having a substantive discussion with the firm. . . . [S]uch 
withdrawal could be made without consent . . . if withdrawal can be 
accomplished without adverse effect on the interests of the client.71
The opinion goes on to explain that the same analysis applies with equal force to a lawyer’s 
discussions with an opposing law firm, as long as the attorney does not discuss the subject 
matter of the current representation.72
To sum up, the core of the rules regarding attorney conflict of interests has remained 
relatively unchanged since the original 1908 cannons.  Though the rules themselves have been 
re-organized from one rule paradigm to the next, the rules themselves continue to be 
expressed in broad terms and strive to protect a lawyer’s professional independence and the 
conservation of client secrets.
B. Attorney Withdrawal Rules
70 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7, cmt. 6 (2002).  
71
 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Fromal Op. 96-400 (1996). 
72 Id.
15
The first rules governing attorney withdrawal did not appear until the adoption of the 
Model Code in 1969.  Canon 2 governed, inter alia, acceptance and withdrawal of client 
representation.73  The rules for permissive withdrawal under the Code were relatively strict. 
The comment to Canon 2 states “A decision by a lawyer to withdraw should be made only on 
the basis of compelling circumstances.”74  Consistent with the comment, the Code specifically 
enumerated circumstances when it was within an attorney’s discretion to withdraw from a 
client.  The Code permitted withdrawal for cause where: a client has rejected an attorney’s 
sound advice, seeks to file a meritless claim, or where continued representation was likely to 
result in a violation of the Codes of Professional Conduct.75  Thus, the Code did not allow 
withdrawal without client consent even if withdrawal would have no adverse affect on the 
client’s interests.76
The largest difference between the 1969 Code and the 1983 Model Rules was the 
ability to terminate permissibly from the representation “if withdrawal can be accomplished 
without material effect on the interests of the client.”77  Paradoxically, a qualification 
accompanied the Rule which states, “A lawyer should not accept representation in a matter 
unless it can be performed competently, promptly . . . and to completion,”78 thus carrying over 
vestiges of the Code’s trepidation towards pre-mature withdrawal.  Nevertheless, as noted by 
73 MODEL CODE OF PROF’L CONDUCT Canon 2 (1969). 
74 Id.
75 Id. at DR 2-110(C)(1) – (6) (1969). 
76 WOLFRAM, supra note 1, at 551.
77 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16(b) (1983).  
78 Id. at R.1.16 cmt. 1. 
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Charles Wolfram, author of the seminal book, Modern Legal Ethics,  “As a disciplinary rule, 
the approach to the Model Rules is preferable.  As statement about minimal loyalty towards a 
client and the appropriate undertakings, the Code speaks on a higher plane.”79
In 2000, the American Legal Institute (ALI) established The Restatement (Third) of 
the Law Governing Lawyers.80   The Restatement reversed the trend set by the ABA’s Model 
Rules and advocates more stringent guidelines for permissive withdrawal, harkening back to 
the traditionalist view under the old Canons.  Under the Restatement, Chapter Two governs 
the Client-Lawyer relationship, including attorney withdrawal81 and Chapter Eight governs 
conflict of interests.    While the actual text of the relevant sections parallels the ABA’s rules, 
it is comment c to Section 132, explaining the relationship between current and former client 
conflicts and the permissive withdrawal rules, which epitomizes the Restatement’s strict 
approach to the attorney withdrawal rules.  Comment c  states that “withdrawal is effective to 
render a representation “former” for the purposes of this Section if it occurs at a point that the 
client and the lawyer contemplated as the end of the representation” or if grounds for 
“permissive withdrawal by the lawyer exist . . . and the lawyer is not motivated primarily by a 
desire to represent a new client.”82  The comment then explicitly illustrates the hot potato rule 
by explaining:
79 WOLFRAM, supra note 1, at 551. 
80
 Note: the First and Second Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers do not exist, 
the current Restatement was labeled as Third to stay consistent with the other Restatements of 
Law.  
81 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 132 (2000). 
82 Id. at § 132 cmt. c.
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If the lawyer is approached by a prospective client seeking representation in a 
mater adverse to an existing client, the present-client conflict may not be 
transformed into a former-client conflict by the lawyer’s withdrawal from the 
representation of the existing client.  A premature withdrawal violates the 
lawyer’s obligation of loyalty to the existing client and can constitute a breach 
of the client-lawyer contract of employment.83
Thus, the Restatement radically connotes that situations more mundane than a hot potato 
scenario constitute a breach of loyalty; other instances of premature withdrawal, such as when 
an attorney discharges a client due to an unexpected increase in workload or sickness, could 
breach the client-lawyer contract of employment.  As support for this proposition, the 
Report’s note erroneously cites the traditional cases enunciating the hot potato rule in 
disqualification proceedings,84 as will be explained in the next section, do not advocate such 
an extreme contract-based theory. 
Much of the Restatement’s approach was incorporated into the 2002 Model Rules.85
Yet, the liberal rules regarding permissive withdrawal contained in the 1983 version of the 
Model Rules remains and the Restatement’s comments regarding the hot potato rule were not 
adopted.  As explained by Margaret Love, a member of the Ethics 2000 Commission, “the 
text [of Rule 1.16] was restructured to make clear that a lawyer may withdraw for any reason 
if withdrawal can be accomplished without material adverse effect on the interests of the 
client.”86  Particularly, Love points out that one of the considerations in adopting the new 
rules was “ethical restrictions on lawyer mobility” in light of “the legal profession’s rapidly 
83
 Id.
84 Id. at Reporter’s Note cmt. c. 
85 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 8, at § 10.2.
86
 Love, supra note 68, at 461. 
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changing internal and external environment.”87  As a whole, the Commission made only 
“minor revisions” for the sake of clarification to the rules governing permissive withdrawal.88
In conclusion, the rules regarding conflict of interests pronounced by both the 
Restatement (Third) and the ABA have remained relatively unchanged since the first set of 
rules in 1908.  Of those changes, the greatest development was the adoption of rules centered 
on a risk calculus – weighing the potential of harm to the client with the realization that the 
lawyer profession is rife with competing interests.89  Specifically, the concurrent conflict of 
interest rules protected both the preservation of client confidentiality and the preservation of 
loyalty – as viewed from the eyes of the client and the community at large.  Meanwhile, the
rules regarding former client conflict of interests merely sought to forever preserve client 
confidences and the prohibition of an attorney from attacking their own work from a prior 
transaction.  On the other hand, though the original Canons did not deal with the rules 
regarding attorney withdrawal from representation of a client, the first rules regarding such in 
the 1969 Code were relatively strict, but subsequent versions gave the attorney greater 
discretion when there was no adverse effect on the client.  
II. EVOLUTION OF THE HOT POTATO RULE
A. Formulation and Adoption of the Hot Potato Rule
The hot potato doctrine emerged from a series of cases dealing with factual situations 
where an attorney failed to realize a potential conflict with a current client when accepting 
87 Id. at 441. 
88 Id. at 461. 
89 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 8, at §10.4.
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new employment and subsequently withdrew from the representation of the prior client to 
avoid disqualification.90  Though not mentioned by name, the notion that one cannot “drop” a 
disfavored client to avoid a conflict debuted in conflict of interest jurisprudence as early as 
1980 in Unified Sewerage Agency v. JELCO, Inc.91 Yet, the so-called “hot potato rule” was 
actually coined in the unimpressive Picker Int’l, Inc. v. Varian Ass., Inc. seven years later, in 
1987.92  For the next fifteen years, the principles underlying the hot potato doctrine spread 
throughout the states and adopted by nearly every jurisdiction.93  However, like many other 
rules, courts ran into instances where formulaic application of the hot potato rule produced 
hollow, unjust results, and they began to carve exceptions the hot potato rule as early as 
1990.94  Finally, in 2001 with the Santacroce v. Neff ,95 a decision out of the New Jersey 
Federal District Court, the hot potato rule was expanded to include situations where a client 
90
 Stevens, supra note 30, at 27.  
91
 646 F.2d 1339.
92
 670 F. Supp. 1363, 1365 (N.D. Ohio 1987). 
93Charles W. Wolfram, Former-Client Conflicts, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 677, 708 
(1997). 
94
 Rossheim, supra note 28, at 5.  See e.g. Gould, Inc. v. Mitsui Mining & Smelting Co, 
738 F. Supp. 1121 (N.D. Ohio 1990) (holding that a conflict that arose through no fault of the 
attorney did not warrant disqualification), which will be discussed more in depth later in this 
note. 
95
 134 F. Supp. 366 (D.N.J. 2001). 
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pre-emptively dismisses a client in anticipation of a more lucrative potential client that the 
attorney would otherwise be unable to represent concurrently.96
Though courts have been attempting to refine the underlying rationale of the hot 
potato rule for nearly fifteen years, one coherent justification has not emerged.  In any event, 
two themes run through the garden-variety applications of the hot potato rule.  First is the 
deterrence of the “patently base and disloyal” act of a lawyer abandoning his client in order to 
switch sides in the midst of litigation,97 and second is the concern for the public view of the 
profession when an attorney does abandons a client out of self-interested greed.98  However, 
this apparent justification does not hold water when held up against the spirit of the rules 
regarding conflict of interest and permissive withdrawal. 
The first case to promote the doctrine that the disqualification rules cannot be 
circumvented by dropping the less-favored client was not based on loyalty at all.   In Unified 
Sewerage Agency v. JELCO,99 a law firm accepted representation of a contractor in a contract 
dispute while contemporaneously engaged in representation against that contractor in an 
unrelated embryonic dispute with the firm’s other client.  Even though both parties initially 
consented to the conflict, the contractor withdrew consent as litigation commenced, 
discharged the law firm in the first lawsuit, and then moved to disqualify the law firm in the 
96 Id. at 372.   
97
 Wolfram, supra note 93, at 708.
98 Harte Baltimore Ltd v. First Pennsylvania Bank, N.A., 655 F. Supp. 419 (S.D. Fl. 
1987) is a good example of a court drawing upon the “appearance of impropriety standard” 
for justification of attorney disqualification in a hot-potato scenario. 
99
 646 F.2d 1339 (9th Cir. 1981).
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second lawsuit.100   The trial court applied Oregon’s former client rules that utilized a 
primitive version of the “substantial relationship” test derived from judge-made law that states 
“an attorney may not represent interests adverse to a former client if the factual context of the 
later representation is similar or related to that of the former representation.”101  The Ninth 
Circuit court disagreed and instead applied Canon 5, which governed concurrent 
representational conflicts stating that “[Canon 5] continues even though the representation 
ceases prior to the filing of the motion to disqualify.  If this were not the case, the challenged 
attorney could always convert a present client into a former client by choosing when to cease 
to represent the disfavored client.”102
In the end, the law firm managed to escape disqualification, despite the court’s 
application of the more stringent standard from Canon 5.103  Nonetheless, the facts of this case 
do not appear to support the court’s central proposition.  The application of Canon 5 in this 
case didn’t thwart the law firm’s attempt to circumvent disqualification because the client was 
the party who discharged the law firm, not vice versa.  Instead, the court nearly fell into the 
trap that many similarly situated courts do when faced with a disqualification issue: whether 
100 Id. at 1352. 
101 Id. at 1344 (citing Trone v. Smith, 621 F.2d 994, 998 (9th Cir. 1980)). 
102 Id. at 1345 n. 4. 
103 Id. at 1351.  The court briefly entertained the contractor’s argument that the 
“appearance of impropriety” argument should apply in the alternative, but as pointed out by 
the court, the more lenient standard of Canon 9 was never intended “to override” Canon 5.  Id.
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to allow a technical violation of the Ethical codes to be used as a weapon to deprive the 
opposing party of its counsel of choice.104
For all intensive purposes, the law firm in Unified Sewerage Agency attempted to do 
the act ethically throughout the concurrent litigation: it had obtained waivers from both parties 
and on three different occasions met with the contractor to discuss whether it wanted the law 
firm to continue to represent them in the litigation.105  Furthermore, the contractor did not 
discharge the law firm until it had found a substitute, then opportunistically proceeded to wait 
for the litigation to proceed for another seven months until filing the motion for 
disqualification106 – reinforcing evidence that the law firm’s actions were either an attempt to 
avoid disqualification, or at the very least, a result of disloyal behavior.
In Unified Sewerage Agency, the potential conflict always existed, but was allowable 
under the Ethical Codes by virtue of the parties’ consent.  In other words, the law firm, though 
acting within the rules, was “tickling the dragon’s tail”107 throughout the course of the 
proceedings by representing concurrently opposite parties.  However, the most difficult 
104
 Rossheim, supra note 28, at 5.  
105 Unified Sewerage Agency v. Jelco, Inc., 646 F.2d 1339, 1342 (9th Cir. 1981). 
106Id. at 1343. 
107
 Crude technique of pushing together manually two pieces of uranium to calculate 
critical mass used by nuclear physicists during the 1940s.  For a classic description, see 
DEXTER MASTERS, THE ACCIDENT (New York: Knopf 1955) (depicting the famous lab 
accident on May 21, 1946, where Dr. Louis Slotin saved his staff when he separated two 
pieces of uranium with his bare hands to halt a nuclear reaction, then tragically died of 
radiation poisoning nine days later). 
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problems often arise when the conflict arises after the agreement to represent a new client.  
One of most common hot potato scenarios is created when two law firms merge.  For 
example, in Ransburg Corporation v. Champion Spark Plug Company,108 a law firm 
represented a patent holder in an infringement proceeding against a spark plug company.  
Sometime later, an attorney from a different law firm created a conflict of interest when 
laterally relocated into the first law firm, bringing with him the spark plug company.109  The 
patent holding company, upon learning of the concurrent representation of its adversary, 
terminated the law firm and moved for disqualification in the initial proceedings.110  The 
court, citing Unified Sewerage Agency, held that not only will the patent holding company be 
treated as a current client for the purpose of not allowing easy circumvention of the rule, 
bolstered by notions of a “client’s right to undivided loyalty” and the fear of public distrust in 
“law firms that switch sides [so] nimbly.”111
108
 648 F. Supp. 1040 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
109 Id. at 1044. 
110 Id. at 1042.  
111 Id. at 1044-45 (citing Analytica, Inc. v. NPD Research, Inc., 708 F.2d 1263, 1269 
(7th Cir. 1983) (modification in original)).  For a similar case involving the merger of a law 
firm that was later disqualified solely on the “appearance of impropriety” grounds see Harte 
Biltmore Ltd. v. First Pa. Bank, 655 F. Supp 419 (S.D. Fl. 1987) (noting that “[a]s mergers 
between law firms become more common, attorneys are increasingly likely to find themselves 
opposing a client after a merger” and that the  “[p]ublic confidence in lawyers and the legal 
system must necessarily be undermined when a lawyer suddenly abandons one client in favor 
of another).  Id. at 422. 
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A recent case in Indiana is also illustrative of this problem. In Reed v. Hoosier Health 
Systems, Inc.,112 a 2005 opinion from the Indiana Court of Appeals, a small law firm that 
represented a number of shareholders in an action against Hoosier Health relocated into a law 
firm that represented that same corporation through an insurance company.113  Though the 
firm offered to withdraw from the representation of Hoosier Health, the court held that 
disqualification was proper, citing that “the offense inherent in taking on the conflicting
representation is compounded by seeking to ‘fire’ the client in pursuit of the attorney’s 
interest in taking on a new, more attractive client.”114
In the case of Hoosier Health, however, one judge concurred with the result, but 
emphasized the potential danger in so readily granting disqualification.115  Most noteworthy, 
Judge Barnes pointed out the ambiguity in Comment 4 to Rule 1.7, also present in the Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct,116 which provides, “If a conflict arises after representation has 
been undertaken, the lawyer ordinarily must withdraw from the representation.”117  However, 
Judge Barnes did not include the entire comment.  Taken out of context, the Comment 4 to 
Rule 1.7 in both the Indiana Rules and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct appear to 
112
 825 N.E.2d 408 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).
113 Id. at 410.
114 Id. at 412 (quoting Universal Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 98 F. Supp. 2d 449, 453 
(S.D.N.Y. 2000).
115 Id. at 414 (Barnes, J. concurring in result with separate opinion). 
116 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, Rule 1.7 cmt. 4 (2002).
117 Id. at 414 (Barnes, J. concurring in result with separate opinion) (citing IND. RULES 
OF PROF’L CONDUCT, R. 1.7 cmt. 4 (2004)).  
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leave open the justification for disqualifying a law firm from representing either party in a 
lawsuit where a conflict arises after representation, as was the case in both Hoosier Health
and Ransburg Corporation.  However, when the comment is read in its entirety, the ambiguity 
is dispelled.  The rest of the comment is as follows:
Where more than one client is involved, whether the lawyer may continue to 
represent any of the clients is determined both by the lawyer’s ability to 
comply with duties owed to the former client and by the lawyer’s ability to 
represent adequately the remaining client or clients, given the lawyer’s duties 
to the former client.118
Judge Barnes humbly points out the proper comment to undermine the majority’s reasoning, 
but given the importance of the rest of the comment, he does not go far enough.   
Finally, in Santacroce v. Neff, a court for the very first time held that a terminated 
client would be treated as a current client in a disqualification hearing even though there 
clearly was no overlap in representation.119 The proceeding involved a law firm that had long 
represented multi-millionaire Arthur Goldberg in both personal matters and in many of his 
corporations.  After a while, the law firm began to represent Goldberg’s girlfriend, 
Santacroce, in matters related to her jewelry business.120  Goldberg subsequently died and 
failed to devise anything to his girlfriend.  Shortly thereafter, the firm became aware that 
Santacroce had the intent to bring a palimony action against the estate.121  In anticipation of 
118 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, R. 1.7 cmt. 4 (2002) (also integrated fully into 
the INDIANA RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, R. 1.7 cmt 4 (2004)) (internal citations omitted). 
119Santacroce v. Neff, 134 F. Supp 2d. 366, 366 (D.N.J 2001). 
120 Id. at 367. 
121 Id. at 368. 
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representing Goldberg’s estate, the firm terminated representation of Santacroce and she filed 
the palimony complaint a week later.122
The court applied Rule 1.7(a) governing current client conflicts, not Rule 1.9, in 
contradiction to contrary precedent that stated that “[t]he relevant date for determining status 
as a present or former client is the date on which the complaint was filed.”123  Instead, the 
court ruled that the hot potato doctrine is the “exception to the general rule that the status of a 
client must be determined by the date of the filed complaint”124 and that “the complaint’s 
actual filing date is not particularly significant when notice of the proposed complaint is what 
precipitated the [withdrawal.]”125  Again, the rationale for the court’s decision rested on the 
dual purpose of the “duty of undivided loyalty to the client” and the possibility that the 
“public confidence in attorneys and the legal system would be undermined.”126
Interestingly, the district court reiterated their holding in Universal City Studios Inc. v. 
Reimerdes127 when it stated:
If, as one judge has written, “the act of suing one’s own client is a ‘dramatic 
form of disloyalty,’” what might be said of trying to drop the first client in an 
122 Id.
123Id. at 369 (quoting Schiffli Embroidery Workers Pension Fund v. Ryan, Beck & 
Co., 1994 WL 62124 (D.N.J. 1994)). 
124Santacroce, 134 F. Supp. 2d at 369. 
125 Id.
126 Id. at 317 (quoting Schiffli, 1994 WL 62124, at *3, n.2). 
127
 98 F. Supp 2d 449 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
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effort to free the attorney to pursue his or her self-interest in taking on a newer 
and more attractive professional engagement.128
However, in this case the temporal element of a lawyer dropping for a client for a “newer and 
more attractive client” isn’t even present: there is no doubt that Goldberg was the law firm’s 
client before Santacroce.129
As is evident from Unified Sewerage Agency, Ransburg Corporation, and Hoosier 
Health, the circumstances under which the hot potato rule have been applied to disqualify law 
firms for the breach of loyalty to their clients are not as simple as the hypothetical given in the 
Introduction.130  On the contrary, the hot potato rule is most often applied when the law firm 
or the attorney is not driven by greed, but rather faced with an ethical dilemma created by 
forces mainly outside his or her control.
B. Exceptions to the Hot Potato Rule
128 Id. at 453.
129
 For an earlier example of this discrepancy see Strategem Development Corp. v. 
Heron Int’l N.V. 756 F. Supp. 789 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) where a law firm that had long 
represented a development corporation in a series of real estate transactions, but was 
disqualified after it erroneously filed an action against a more recent client. The court held 
that “[the law firm’s] obligation to Strategem do not trump those it owes to [the other client], 
even if they predated them” and therefore the law firm must withdraw from representing 
either client. Id. at 794. 
130 See supra, note 30 and accompanying text. 
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Even as jurisdictions were adopting the hot potato rule, other courts were already 
revisiting the question of whether a conflict of interest exists whenever a law firm is forced to 
choose between two current clients.131  As was alluded to in Unified Sewerage Agency, many 
courts are now faced with the dilemma of the duty of the court “to enforce the ethical 
obligations of the profession”132 and adherence to the hot potato exception when justice does 
not require it.133  Common examples of when courts will allow a firm to drop one client in 
favor of another when a conflict arises due to the unilateral actions of the client, or through 
factors outside the control of the law firm.  The exceptions have been appropriately labeled as 
the “happenstance rule,” exemplified in Gould v. Mitsui Mining & Smelting134 and Florida 
Insurance Guaranty Ass., Inc. v. Carey Canada, Inc.,135 or the “accommodation client rule,” 
illustrated in In Re Rite Aid. 136
131
 Rossheim, supra note 28, at 5. 
132Ransburg Corporation v. Champion Spark Plug Co.,, 648 F. Supp. 1040, 1047 
(N.D. Ill. 1986). 
133
 Anthony Davis, On ‘Thrust-Upon’ Conflicts, Advance Waivers of Future Conflicts, 
and the ‘Hot-Potato’ Rule, 234 N.Y.L.J. 3 (2005) (contrasting the New York Committee on 
Professional and Judicial Ethics balancing approach to pre-mature withdrawal when a conflict 
arises with “mechanically applying the hot-potato rule”). Id.
134
 738 F. Supp. 1121 (N.D. Ohio 1990).
135
 749 F. Supp. 255 (S.D. Fl. 1990) 
136
 139 F. Supp 2d 649 (E.D. Pa. 2001). 
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In both Gould and Florida Insurance Guarantee, the law firms encountered what the 
New York City Bar Ethics Committee labels as “thrust upon” conflicts.137  In order for a 
conflict to be considered “thrust upon” the lawyer or law firm, and therefore qualify as an 
exception to the hot potato rule, four elements must exist: 
1) [the conflict must] not exist at the time either representation commenced, 
but arose only during the ongoing representation of both clients, where 2) the 
conflict was not reasonably foreseeable at the outset of the representation, 3) 
the conflict arose through no fault of the lawyer, and 4) the conflict is of a type 
that is capable of being waived.138
In Gould, Jones, Day represented the company, Gould, against Pichi ney in a patent-
infringement suit.  At the same time, Jones, Day represented IGT in various matters.  Shortly 
thereafter, a conflict arose when created a conflict Picheney acquired IGT.  The court held 
that while concurrent representation of the two parties would certainly be considered 
inappropriate, the court allowed Jones, Day to discontinue representation of either Gould or 
IGT.139  The court supported the holding on the basis that it did not see how “the rules of 
ethics will be furthered” by disqualifying Jones, Day due to a conflict that it did not create.”140
 Similarly, in Florida Insurance Guaranty, a law firm represented a mining company 
in asbestos litigation in the 1970s.141  At the same time, the law firm also represented a 
Florida insurance company.  In the 1980s, the mining company’s insurance carrier and all of 
the other insurance carriers in the state became insolvent.  By operation of law, the lone 
137Davis, supra note 133, at 3.
138
 Davis, supra note 133, at 3, col. 1 (2005) (citing NYC Op. 2005-5). 
139 Gould v. Mitsui Mining & Smelting Co., 738 F. Supp. 1121, 1128 (N.D. Ill. 1990). 
140 Id.
141
 749 F. Supp. 255 (S.D. Fl. 1990) 
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insurance company represented by the law firm was forced to assume the liability of all of the 
insurance companies – including an insurance company currently involved in litigation 
against the client mining company.  Again, the court found that it would not “require 
disqualification for the mere happenstance of an unseen concurrent adverse representation.”142
Balancing the interests involved, the court found that a judgment in the alternative would 
“unfairly prevent a client from retaining counsel of choice and would penalize and attorney 
who had done no wrong.”143
Courts have added a third exception to the hot potato rule individuals categorized as 
“accommodation clients.”  The irony, however, is that this same exception, more liberal than 
the prior two exceptions, finds its genesis in the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing 
Lawyers.144  In Rite Aid, a law firm represented a corporation and it’s former CEO in 
securities class litigation.145  As the litigation progressed, it became evident that the former 
CEO breached its fiduciary duty to the corporation.  Upon discovery, the law firm withdrew 
their representation from the CEO, and he subsequently retained his own counsel.  In this 
instance, the court found that Rule 1.9 applied to the inquiry and not the more stringent Rule 
1.7, and that the representation did not warrant disqualification because the CEO was merely 
an accommodation client as and the corporation was the primary client.146  In other words, the 
142 Id. at 260. 
143 Id.
144 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §132 cmt i.  
145 In Re Rite Aid, 139 F. Supp 2d 649 (E.D. Pa. 2001).
146 Id. at 660.
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representation of the CEO was by virtue of the concurrent representation of the corporation 
and existed for the sake of lowering attorney costs.147
In essence, the court held that the  “primary duty of loyalty” was to the corporation 
and therefore the firm could withdraw without penalty.148  On its face, it would appear that 
even under the more liberal “substantially relationship” test under Rule 1.9, continued 
representation of the corporation would be barred.  However, Comment i to the Restatement 
(Third), which the court relied upon as authority,149 explains in situation arises between the 
“primary client” and the “accommodation client,” the accommodation client “impliedly 
consent[s] to the lawyer’s continuing to represent the regular client in the matter.”150
III. ANALYSIS OF THE INCONGRUENCE OF THE HOT POTATO RULE AND THE MODEL RULES
The adoption of the hot potato rule represents a dramatic shift in the and way that 
conflict of interests and attorney withdrawal has been viewed in attorney ethics and the 
interests the modern ethical rules seek protect.  The purpose of the conflict of interest rules are 
three fold 1) protect client confidentiality, 2) maintain an attorney’s independent judgment, 
and 3) maintain the client’s and the public’s confidence in attorneys and the legal system.151
Meanwhile, the attorney withdrawal rules seek to balance lawyer mobility, professional 
147 Id. at 658. 
148 Id. at 659.  
149 Id. (citing the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 132, 
cmt i. (2000)). 
150 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 132, cmt. i (2000).
151O’Mary, supra note 16, at 1204.  
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independence and an attorney’s own moral constitution with the countervailing interests of 
preventing or minimizing harm to the client.152  The purpose of this section is to prove that the 
hot potato rule does not adequately invoke any of these interests in any of these three 
applications.
The hot potato rule cannot be supported on the text of the conflict of interests rules or 
the rules governing an attorney’s ability to withdraw from representation permissively.  In this 
section, each of the scenarios where the hot potato rules have been applied will be analyzed in 
turn.  The first scenario is when an attorney unwittingly becomes entangled in a conflict of 
interest between two current clients.  Though this scenario is the most difficult to defend 
because the attorney is faced with co-equal duties of loyalty to each of his clients.153  Any 
attempt to protect the interests of one of the clients necessarily causes injury to the other.154
Thus, as one judge has noted, the effect of allowing the attorney to choose which client to 
drop is equivalent to “dividing clients into two classes and holding that lawyers may injure a 
second-class client with impunity so long as they do so to advance the interest of a first-class 
client.”155
However, this fear is unavailing and fails to take into account the alternative – that is, 
forcing an attorney to withdraw totally from both representations.  Keep in mind; just because 
an attorney attempts to turn one client into a “former client” vis-à-vis withdrawal, he is not 
immune from the repercussions of his unethical actions of concurrently representing adverse 
152ABA MODEL RULES OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY R. 1.16(b) (2002).  
153Flatt, 885 P.2d at 958. 
154Id. at 960 (Kennard, J. dissenting).  
155Id.
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clients.  Rule 1.7 comment 3 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct states that when “[a] 
conflict of interest [exists] before representation is undertaken . . . the representation must be 
declined, unless the lawyers obtains the informed consent of each client.”156  Therefore, the 
breach in loyalty is the result of accepting the adverse representation in the first place.  In any 
event, the attorney is liable for sanctions, providing a “solemn denunciation of a violation of a 
lawyer’s ethical duties.”157  Enforcement of the hot potato rule in this context only carries it 
into disqualification proceedings; however, at this point, the damage has already been done.  
The only added effect is both parties are deprived of their attorney of choice as opposed to 
just one.158
The second situation arises when a client originally consents to a conflict and 
subsequently withdraws that consent, as in the case of Unified Sewerage Agency.159
However, the Model Rules explicitly deal with this situation in the comments and describe a 
different outcome than the hot potato rule.160  Comment 21 states:
  A client who has given consent to a conflict may revoke the consent and, like 
any other client, may terminate the lawyer’s representation at any time.  
Whether revoking consent to the client’s own representation precludes the 
lawyer from continuing to represent other clients depends on the 
circumstances, including the nature of the conflict, whether the client revoked 
because of a material change in circumstances, the reasonable expectations of 
156MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, R. 1.7 cmt. 3 (2002).  
157 Saloman, 790 F. Supp  at 1401. 
158 Id.
159 See, e.g. Unified Sewerage Agency, 646 F.2d at 1344. 
160MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, R. 1.7 cmt. 21 (2002).  
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the other client and whether material detriment to the other clients of the 
lawyer would result.161
This comment is in direct opposition to the prohibition in the hot potato rule for two reasons.  
First, it is implicit in the comment that the attorney withdraws from the representation when a 
client revokes his consent.  If this were not the case, the second clause stating “[w]hether 
revoking consent to the client’s own representation precludes the lawyer from continuing to 
represent other clients” would be rendered inoperative because Comment 6 of the same rule 
states that “a lawyer may not act as an advocate in one matter against a person the lawyers 
represents in some other matter, even when the maters are wholly unrelated.”162  This clause 
is a reference, in part, to the “substantial relationship” test under rule 1.9 governing former 
client conflicts.  Thus, a reasonable interpretation of the comment is that when the matters are 
wholly unrelated and a client has consented to the concurrent representation, representation of 
the other client will be appropriate.  
Second, because withdrawal did not cause actual harm to the now-former client, that 
client’s interests are weighed, pursuant to the last clause of the comment, against the interests 
of both the lawyer and the other client.163  Here, the other client is innocent and should not 
have to bear the cost of the other client revoking their consent.164  The attorney is innocent as 
161Id.
162Id. at cmt. 6.  
163 Id. at cmt. 21. 
164Salomon, 790 F. Supp. at 1400.  
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well because he fulfilled his initial duty of giving both clients informed consent.165  Forcing 
the attorney to withdraw from both cases entirely is a  “material” detriment under Comment 
21.  On balance, a client’s exercise of the right to revoke consent and the loyalty of their 
attorney does not justify depriving a second client of their choice of comments in the Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct address this situation. 
 As the concurring judge noted in Reed, Rule 1.7 comment 4 explains that when a 
conflict arises after representation commences, Rule 1.16 governs whether the attorney may 
continue to represent any of the clients after the attorney withdraws from the representation 
that caused the conflict.166  Such a reading has two effects.  First, forcing an attorney to 
withdraw from the other representation according to the hot potato rule would render this 
comment worthless.  Second, the law would have the contradictory effect of prohibiting the 
continuation of conflicting representation while prohibiting withdrawal to avoid it.167
The final two scenarios raise serious questions relating to our current system of 
attorney ethics, loyalty, and the state of the legal marketplace.  The true hot potato scenario, 
where there is a  “gap” between the withdrawal from one client and the formation of the 
attorney-client relationship of the new, more lucrative client,168 calls into question the purpose 
165In order for a client to consent, the MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, R. 1.7(b)(4) 
requires “each affected client [to give] informed consent, confirmed in writing.” 
166Reed, 825 N.E.2d at 414 (Barnes, J. concurring); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT, R. 1.7 cmt. 4 (2002). 
167
 Tuchler, supra note 18, at 1029. 
168 See Santacroce, 134 F. Supp 2d at 366.  
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of loyalty in ethics jurisprudence and the risks that the rules of attorney professional conduct 
wish to take into consideration.
As described prior, the current approach of the ethical rules is to balance the inevitably 
of an attorney facing a conflict with the relative risk that an intolerable amount of harm will 
manifest.169  Therefore, an analysis of what harms are likely to befall the “dropped” client and 
which principles seek to protect his interests under the hot potato rule is required.  There is no 
doubt that loyalty is the central concern in the conflict of interests rules and the hot potato 
rule.  However, pushed to its outer boundaries, notions of loyalty deprive individuals from 
obtaining their clients of choice170 – ultimately leading to a shortage in supply of legal 
services and higher attorney’s fees.  Therefore, only issues of loyalty that have the potential to 
cause actual harm are taken into consideration.  In case of the Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct, a breach of loyalty is intolerable when 1) there is a risk that confidential client 
information is shared, 2) representation will be limited due to the interests another, and 3) 
sufficient damage to the public’s confidence will occur.171
Geoffrey Hazards and William Hodes, authors of The Law of Lawyering, are the most 
ardent, and arguably only, opponents of the hot potato rule.172  Their first argument rests on 
the relationship between Rules 1.7 and Rules 1.9 – the rules governing current and former 
169 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 8 at §10.4.
170Id. at §10.2. 
171
 ABA STANDARDS OF IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS, II. THEORETICAL 
FRAMEWORK, R. 4(a). 
172 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 8, at §20.10. 
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client conflicts, respectively.173  Both rules deal explicitly with the protection of loyalty, but to 
varying degrees based on the interests involved.174  For the most part, the analysis for whether 
an attorney has breached his duty of loyalty to either a former client or a present client is 
largely the same; the goal of the former client rules is to “provide assurance during the 
representation that they have no need to fear suffering adverse consequences later of having 
retained a lawyer currently.”175 The one exception is that an attorney cannot concurrently 
represent two clients, absent consent, even if those matters are unrelated.176  In this respect, 
the loyalty interest regarding the representation of current client is less “concrete.”177  On the 
other hand, the requirement that an attorney cannot represent anyone in a matter adverse to a 
current client reflects the intangible harm to the ongoing client relationship when an attorney 
presently advocates against that client.  
Second, concurrently representing two clients in unrelated matters assumes there 
remains a subconscious risk that the attorney’s professional judgment will be compromised.178
Conversely, under the “substantial relationship” analysis, Rule 1.9 protects attorney loyalty to 
former clients because it prevents the attorney from using confidential information in future, 
173 Id.
174 Id. at §13.4.
175 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 8, at § 13.4.
176 Compare MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R.1.7 cmt. 6 and R. 1.9(a) & (b). 
177 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 8, at § 13.4.
178 Developments in the Law – Conflicts of Interests in the Legal Profession, II. 
Models of Ethical Regulation, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1251, 1265 n. 68 (1981)
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related matters.179  Therefore, the hot potato rule’s requirement of using the current conflict of 
interests rules in analyzing whether there has been a breach of loyalty is erroneous because 
the hot potato rule does not call into question the independence of the attorney’s professional 
judgment or harm to the ongoing attorney-client.  
The largest roadblock to Hazard & Hodes structural argument is the adoption of 
Comment 6 to Rule 1.7 dealing with job negotiations with an adverse firm or party.180  Recall, 
Comment 6 warns against the possibility of an attorney’s own economic interest materially 
limiting the efficacy of a current representation.181  Yet, the accompanying ABA Formal Op. 
96-400 actually encourages withdrawal from the representation absent client consent.182
Thus, instead of Comment 6 being the strongest support for the hot potato rule in the Model 
Rules, the ABA’s interpretation is explicit disapproval of it.
Hazard & Hodes second argument against the hot potato rule is that it is contrary to 
the permissive withdrawal scheme under Rule 1.16 of the Model Rules if Professional 
Conduct because “those provisions permit a lawyer to cease representation – assuming no 
harm to the client – for no reason or because the lawyer is bored or overworked or because 
more lucrative work presents itself.”183  To Hazard and Hodes, there is no breach of loyalty to 
the former client because he has not suffered a cognizable harm under Rule 1.16(b).184
179 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 8, at §20.10. 
180 See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
181 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7, cmt. 6 (2002).  
182
 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Fromal Op. 96-400 (1996). 
183HAZARD & HODES, supra note 8, at § 20.10. 
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Viewed through this framework, the hot potato rule exemplifies a tension in the rules 
themselves: the fact that loyalty to a client “subjugates personal autonomy” of the attorney.185
The Model Rules recognizes this tension and therefore aims to limit an attorney’s discretion 
to withdraw when the client will suffer harm.  The hot potato rule’s addition of a mental 
element to the permissive withdrawal rule while dispensing of the showing of harm 
requirement is an aberration in the entire withdrawal scheme.186  The result, Hazard & Hodes 
concludes, is to impermissibly “convert the lawyer-client relationship into one of continuing 
servitude.”187    On a deeper level, this damages the personal nature of the attorney client 
freedom because it limits the ability of the attorney to choose which causes are worthy of their 
loyalty;188 the hot potato rule imposes that choice upon him.  
In many ways, Hazard & Hodes criticisms of the hot potato rule in this context fail to 
take into account the most oft cited reason for the rule: the public’s negative view of an 
attorney who fickly drops a client for monetary purposes.189  Upon inspection, this reason 
cannot be justified given the current approach of the Model Rules for two reasons.  
First, the harm, if any caused by such an act is not morally equivalent to the other 
areas of the Model Rules that take into account an attorney’s motivation.  There are two other 
sections of the Model Rules where misconduct is dependent on the lawyer’s motivation.  The 
first is contained in Model Rule of Professional Conduct Rule. 4.4 – Respect for Third Parties.  
185McChrystal, supra note 3, at 376.  
186HAZARD & HODES, supra note 8, at § 20.10
187 Id. 
188Id.
189Ransburg, 648 F. Supp. at 1044-45.
40
Under Rule 4.4, it is misconduct for “a lawyer shall not use means that have no substantial 
purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person.”190  The second area is under 
Rule 8.4 comment 3, which states, “A lawyer who, in the course of representing a client, 
knowingly manifests by words or conduct, bias or prejudice based upon race, sex, religion, 
national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation or socioeconomic status.”191  Actions 
contrary to rule 8.4 are unethical under the general principle that any attempt to use the courts 
to cause harm undermines elementary notions of justice.  Even absent harm, an attorney’s 
motivation to perpetuate a wrong via the courts calls into question his role as an officer of the 
court.  As for the comment to Rule 8.4, there is no comparison to an attorney who is driven 
partially by greed, a principle that is acceptable under the Model Rules, and one who uses 
their position as an attorney to witness their prejudices.  Moreover, under Rule 8.4 there is 
only a violation if “such actions are prejudicial to the administration of justice,”192 contrary to 
the hot potato rule where no harm is required.  
The hot potato rule, Rule 8.4, and Rule 4.4 have “intrinsic,” as opposed to 
“instrumental” justifications for their existence.193  In the student project titled Developments 
in the Law – Conflicts of Interests in the Legal Profession, II. Models of Ethical Regulation, 
the authors extensively explore the philosophical underpinnings of the ethical precepts that 
govern attorney conduct.194  In the article, an intrinsically justified form is misconduct is one 
190MODEL RULES PROF’L CONDUCT, R. 4.4(a) (2002). 
191 Id. at R. 8.4, cmt. 3.
192Id.
193
 Harvard Law Review, supra note 178, at 1253.
194 Id. at 1251. 
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that is “prohibited, not because of [its] consequences, but because of structured features of the 
act itself that make it wrong to bring about the consequence in this way.”195  In this respect, 
the hot potato rule based on intrinsic justifications, not because of the harm that occurs, but 
because dropping a client disrespects the “integrity of the client as an individual” and is 
“inherently wrong.”196  If this is true, the permissive withdrawal rule embodied in Rule 
1.16(b)(1) could not exist at all because this intrinsic view implies that an attorney is unethical 
whenever an attorney chooses to end his fiduciary relationship before its natural conclusion 
because the attorney has, by definition, placed some other interest above the desire to further 
represent the client.
Ethics that are justified intrinsically naturally have their genesis under Canon 5’s 
“appearance of impropriety” standard – the vestige that an attorney is acting ethical as long as 
he appears to be acting ethical.197  In any event, Rule 1.9 governing conflicts of interests still 
provides the better paradigm.  When the attorney-client relationship is severed, an attorney’s 
actions only appear disloyal if they are relevant to the prior representation.198  At the same 
time, regardless of the framework to evaluate the conduct, speculative harms that seek to 
protect the public, or, at the very least, hypothetical client expectations are only justified if the 
harms are great.199  In terms of the hot potato rule, the harms to the public or to the 
195Id.
196 Id. at 1258, 1260. 
197
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expectations of the individual client are neither probable nor substantial enough to justify its 
limiting effect on individual attorney decision-making. 
IV. PRACTICAL EFFECT S OF THE HOT POTATO RULE
In addition to the lack of support for hot potato rule under the current Model Rules and 
the philosophical underpinnings of the attorney-client relationship, three problems emerge 
when the hot potato rule is applied to garden variety premature withdrawal scenarios.  First, 
the hot potato rule is not likely to apply to small law firms or concern the most vulnerable 
clients.200  Second, the efficacy of the rule is limited under the fact that the prohibition is 
“contracted around” via advance waiver agreements offered by large law firms.  Third, in the 
absence of an advance waiver agreement, the rule is circumvented the ability of law firms to 
juggle potentially adverse clients until the proverbial plate can be cleared of all conflicts.201
Whenever an attorney withdraws before the natural completion of the representation, 
transactional costs necessarily are borne by the client.202  Early withdrawal forces the client to 
find new counsel and expend resources getting the new counsel “up to speed” in the litigation.  
This is true regardless of whether the client suffers actual prejudice from the withdrawal.  
Individuals suffer the most from attorney withdrawal because of the “informational 
assymetr[y]” that exists between unsophisticated clients and their attorneys and the fact that 
individuals are less adept at navigating through the legal marketplace.203  Thus, it follows 
200 SHAPIRO, supra note 5, at 137. 
201 Id. at 189. 
202
 Pilcher, supra note 13, at 846. 
203 SHAPIRO, supra note 5, at 137. 
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logically that individuals, particular those less affluent, as “one shot participants in the [legal] 
marketplace,”204 will suffer the greatest economic harm from the severance of the agency 
relationship between attorney and client in hot potato scenarios.205  Paradoxically, individuals 
are the least likely victims of being dropped like a hot potato because they pose little threat of 
barring a law firm from future representation from a conflict of interest. In contrast, a 
corporation may have multiple subsidiaries and be engaged in numerous lawsuits in any given 
moment, thus creating multiple avenues upon which the client may veto future 
representation.206
Second, smaller law firms tend to represent less affluent, individual clients tend.207
Small law firms are less likely to be tempted to drop a client because they, as a whole, 
encounter less unforeseeable conflicts of interest less often than larger law firms do.208  As 
204
 Label used to described “[individuals who] will hire a lawyer only once in their 
lifetime.” David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 799, 829 
(1992).
205 Id. 
206SHAPIRO, supra note 5, at 100-01.
207Id. at 36. 
208 Id. at 20.  Perhaps with one exception: conflicts arising from an attorney 
concurrently representing either co-defendants or co-plaintiffs in a lawsuit or criminal matter 
tend to be common in smaller law firms.  However, as a practical matter, these situations do 
not need to invoke the hot potato rule because upon withdrawal a conflict would still exist 
under the more liberal “substantial relationship” standard of MODEL RULE OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT R. 1.9.   See also Model RULE OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7, cmt 29 (stating 
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Susan Shapiro, sociologist and senior research fellow for the American Bar Association, 
presents in Tangled Loyalties: Conflict of Interest in Legal Practice, “[c]onflicts of interest 
multiply rapidly as firms expand.”209  In her book, Shapiro illustrates this when she quotes a 
downstate Illinois lawyer who claims that concurrently representing two clients whose 
interests are adverse is “as freak as running into the same guy twice on the highway.”210
Because larger law firms are more likely to have a greater number of clients, and, of 
those clients, a greater percentage of them will be complex organizations (i.e. corporations), it 
is therefore certain that the hot potato rule will overwhelmingly be invoked against larger law 
firms representing corporations or their subsidiaries.211  However, while the makeup of a law 
firm’s clientele may make it susceptible to conflicting interests, it is often the bureaucratic 
nature of the law firm that enables it to “skirt” the hot potato rule.212
“Ordinarily, the lawyer will be forced to withdraw from representing all of the clients if the 
common representation fails.”)  
209 SHAPIRO, supra note 5, at 186 – 91.  
210 Id. at 70. 
211
 The cases in Section II of this Note reinforce this fact: all of the cases involved 
medium to large size law firms and all but one involved corporations.  The lone case 
regarding representation of an individual, Santacroce, 134 F.Supp.2d at 367-69, was merely 
by virtue of the one of client’s status as CEO of the client corporation and the second client’s 
status as the CEO’s girlfriend. 
212 SHAPIRO, supra note 5, at 189. 
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The first and most obvious way for a law firm to become nearly immune is for the 
client to sign a prospective waiver to consenting to the conflict.213  Prospective waivers to 
consent to future conflicts are permissible according to the ABA.214  A client may consent to a 
conflict arising under the hot potato rule despite the adverse party is not identifiable; the client 
only needs to be “given enough information to make an intelligent decision.”215  However, the 
ability of a client to consent to this type of conflict of interest is problematic because the 
conflict is inherently a moral one.216  The supposed conflict in the hot potato rule cannot be 
cured by screening, so it is difficult to justify how a client can consent to a “patently base and 
disloyal” action.217  As a practical matter, Shapiro notes, clients tend to disfavor these 
“lawyer-client prenuptial agreements . . . for the same reason lovers decry prenuptial 
agreements: they represent a rather distrustful, pessimistic beginning to a relationship, at best, 
and may scare off prospective partners at worst.”218  It is common for corporations to have 
rules to never consent to a conflict.219
Even absent a waiver from a client, large law firms have devised way to circumvent 
the hot potato rule.  In Tangled Loyalties, Shapiro gives several examples of how law firms 
are able to use their large bureaucracies to juggle smaller clients while anticipating larger 
213 Id. at 187. 
214
 John W. Allen, Conflicts of Interest – The Basics, Feb. 1999 at 183. 
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ones.220  The most common method is the “screw up excuse,” which may be possible when a 
firm receives a smaller case on referral and a more lucrative client presents itself a short time 
later.221  Here, the firm will merely call back the referring attorney or law firm and as one 
attorney put it, “claim a mistake had been made, that our docket department screwed up and 
we already had the case in for somebody else.”222  Another tactic is keeping the new client in 
limbo, or “juggling the hot potato.”223  In this case, the attorney tells the new client that they 
must check in with their “executive committee,” or the equivalent, until the firm is able to 
“clear the underbrush” and remove whatever conflicts may be present.224  In essence, “firms 
[are able to] use their bureaucratic intake procedures as a delaying tactic, [or] use their 
contacts with insurers are a buffer between clients, and so on.”225
To be sure, corporations deserve loyal representation just as much as individuals, 
however, the justifications supporting the hot potato rule break down when applied in the 
corporate context.  First, supporters of the hot potato rule expose a “friendship” view of the 
220 SHAPIRO, supra note 5, at 189.   
221 Id.
222 Id.
223 Id. at 190.
224 Id.
225 SHAPIRO, supra note 5, at 187. Another method that Shapiro encountered in the 
course of her book was the use of threatening withdrawal as a tool to get the client to settle an 
ongoing case quickly.  Id. at 187.  Thus, instead of dropping the client like a hot potato, the 
law firm “drop[s] the client slowly and ambivalently like a bad habit. Id. at 189.  This strategy 
is patently unethical.  Stanley v. Richmond, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 768, 782-83 (1993). 
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attorney-client relationship; that is, loyalty is breached when the attorney takes any action not 
authorized by his client.226  However, this view weakens as corporations begin to treat outside 
legal services as a commodity.227  Today, more corporations utilize in-house counsel for 
routine legal work and utilize firms on a “project by project, case by case basis.”228  They also 
tend to allocate their legal needs to several law firms at the same time.229  Therefore, the risk 
that the corporation has actually felt “betrayed” is relatively slight when the corporation 
already has other counsel waiting in the wings.230  The same is true when the corporation has 
the luxury of in-house counsel, as was the case in Ransburg Corp.231 As the court in Atromick 
International, Inc v. Drustar232 noted, “The concepts of having a ‘personal attorney’ or a 
‘general corporate counsel’ are much less meaningful today, especially among sophisticated 
users of legal services, than in the past.”233  The progression is natural: “[a]s corporate clients 
226
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227
 Kimberly Kirkland, Ethics in Large Law Firms: The Principle of Pragmatism, 35 
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. . . become less loyal to the firms they hire, lawyers . . . become less loyal to the firms that 
employ them.”234
Because there is no actual “harm” done to the client from the actual withdrawal, i.e. 
the case was not prejudiced, it is unlikely that true hot potato scenarios are brought to the 
attention of disciplinary officials.  In addition, the ex post review system inherent in 
disciplinary processes are of little use to corporations.235  Instead, corporations depend on 
disqualification motions to enforce the ethical rules.236  Thus, because there has been no 
actual harm to the client and because it is unrealistic to say that the corporation is “betrayed” 
by the so-called disloyal act of the attorney, the use of disqualification as a mode of 
enforcement of the ethical rules is inappropriate – the proceedings have not been “tainted” by 
the acts of the attorney.237
When used as a vehicle for exacting attorney disqualification, the hot potato rule is 
reduced to a mere “pretext to cause their adversaries expense and delay.”238  This, in turn, 
encourages “taint-shoppers,” which are defined as “institutional clients [that] sprinkle 
insignificant litigation among many firms, solely so they may bring motions to disqualify 
234
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their opponent’s counsel in future litigation.”239  Many courts, including the one in Reed v. 
Hoosier Health, have already acknowledged this danger.240  In the end, the use of the hot 
potato rule as a “sword”241 to disqualify opposing counsel may have the effect of 
“undermining public confidence in the legal profession.”242
Finally, all conflict of interest rules inevitably “pit partners or practice groups against 
each other” because “decisions about which client to take and which client to turn away” 
inevitably leads to prioritization of one group above another.243  As Shapiro notes at the end 
of her discussion, the extension of the client’s veto to future representation vis-à-vis the hot 
potato rule leaves the law firm with no choice but to decline representation from the 
239Id.  For example, corporations continually attempted to keep on retainer the two 
leading Mergers & Acquisitions firms on Wall Street during the 1980s in order to prevent 
those firms from leading hostile takeover against their companies.  Id.
240For another example, see SWS Financial Fund A. v. Solomon Brothers, 790 F. 
Supp. 1392 (N.D. Ill. 1992), where the judge acknowledged:
Clients of enormous size and wealth, and with a large demand for legal 
services should not be encouraged to parcel their business among dozens of the 
best law firms as a means of purposefully creating the potential for conflict.  
With simply a minor “investment” of some token business, such clients would 
in effect be buying an insurance policy against that law firm's adverse 
representation.
Id. at 1402.
241Rossheim, supra note 28, at 5 (quoting from an interview with William Hodes). 
242
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perspective client, thus exposing further the “fault lines within the law firm” when “a lawyer 
bringing in a huge piece of business is paralyzed by the paltry case of a colleagues.”244
IV. CONCLUSION 
The rationales supporting the application of the hot potato rule are unavailing in 
today’s legal marketplace.245  On the one hand, the intentions of those who support rule are 
admirably idealistic; but the rule as applied fails to produce its desired effect.246  As a matter 
of logic, the hot potato rule does not to sit squarely within the current Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct, specifically within the liberal rules governing permissive 
withdrawal.247  As a matter or principle, conceptions of loyalty in the hot potato doctrine do 
not comport with the type of interests traditionally protected under the conflict of interests 
rules.248  Finally, as applied, the rule fails to protect the type of clients that are least able to 
bear the costs of an attorney’s premature withdrawal.249  As infrequent and unsophisticated 
244 SHAPIRO, supra note 5, at 191. 
245 See Love, supra note 68, at 442, 443 (noting the Model Rule’s mindfulness of the 
rapidly changing professional environment). 
246Pilcher, supra note 13, at 842.
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248 See generally Eleanor W, Meyers, Examining Independence and Loyalty, 72 TEMP. 
L. REV. 857 (1999) (explaining the interests involved in lawyer mobility and client loyalty). 
249 See McChrystal, supra note 3, at 417 (stating that “client abandonment always 
imposes some cost on the client, if only in terms of the client’s hurt feelings, annoyance, or 
inconvenience”).
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users of legal services, individuals are more likely to view their attorney as a counselor, and 
less of an advocate.250  Individuals innately feel the sense of betrayal when an attorney 
suddenly abandons them in order to “switch sides” or pursue representation of another 
client.251  Nonetheless, overzealous use of the hot potato rule by corporate clients not even 
harmed increases the danger of producing unnecessary and damaging satellite litigation, the 
sole purpose of which is to increase overall costs of litigation and cause delay.252  In this 
respect, the hot potato rule has been adopted in an era where it has no import.  
The hot potato rule is a rule by fiat.  As such, courts have attempted to justify its 
existence based on broad aphorisms of loyalty with little inquiry into their underlying worth.  
The effect is that courts, from the very beginning, have had to revisit the rule in order to carve 
out numerous exceptions to find a “fit” for the rule in today’s professional thought and 
practice.253  As more exceptions are created, the shaky framework upon which the hot potato 
rule was built withers under its own weight.  Therefore, the American Bar Association and the 
courts in the respective states need to resuscitate the permissive rules of withdrawal that focus 
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on the actual harm caused to the client and not the attorney’s subjective motivation for doing 
so. 
